Effluent charges : good government, but bad business by Best, Ronnie E.
Effluent Charges:
Good Government, but Bad Business 









R o n n | 'C  t  B e'sl
r L OW 0 /T, I c S W 'T  h -
Date:
E ffluen t Charges - Good G overnm ent, bu t Bad Business
In examining current government policy on regulating negative externalities 
caused by pollution, it becomes obvious that more efficient policies are needed. 
One such policy, which many economists support, is an effluent charge.
However, the groups who influence government most rarely support effluent 
charges. In this paper I w ill cover common economic theory used to support 
effluent charges, mention some arguments against effluent charges, and finish 
with their economic affect on business.
To establish the framework of this paper a definition of current and new 
policy are required. Current policy will be referred to in this paper as regulation. 
This consists of a government agency estimating effluent levels of industries, then 
requiring the firm s in these industries to take specific measures that the 
government agency feels w ill reduce efFluents to an optimum level. The effect of 
this policy is diverse and complex, but this paper will consider the intent rather 
than the specific regulation. The new policy being discussed w ill be called an 
effluent charge throughout the paper. This consists of the government levying a 
tax on firms based on the amount of effluents produced by the firm. In this paper 
this tax is assumed to be constant at all levels of effluents and consistent from firm 
to firm.
There is substantial literature comparing effluent charges to regulation and 
their effect on society. The three main points are: least cost, incentives, and 
welfare loss. The first question is whether regulation and effluent charges are 
w  least cost solutions. W hen we look at graph 1 we see the marginal control cost
curves of three firms. The proper effluent charge is plotted on the Y axis and the
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proper regulation level is plotted on the X axis. To keep the example simple it is 
assumed that the distance along the line plotted from the effluent charge between 
firm s 1 and 2 is equal to the distance between firms 2 and 3. Furthermore it is 
assumed that the distance, along the line plotted from the regulation level, 
between firm s 3 and 2 is equal to the distance between firms 2 and 1. So at the 
effluent charge E and the regulation level R the level of effluent abatement is 
equal. At the effluent charge E notice that no firm can reduce one more unit of 
effluents at a lower cost than the last unit reduced by other firms. However at the 
regulation level R firm 3 can reduce its next unit of effluents at a lower cost than 
both firm  2 or 1's last unit abated and firm 2 can reduce its next unit of effluents at 
a lower cost than firm 1's last unit abated. This shows that effluent charges are a 






The second point is that effluent charges give a greater incentive to prevent 
pollution and reduce abatement costs compared to regulation. In graph 2 we have 
two marginal control cost curves, the firm 's original curve MCC (Marginal Control 
Cost) and a cost curve after some technological advancement MCC*. Under 
regulation a firm cannot remove its current abatement equipment until the EPA 
decides the new equipment is better. When they do decide it is better the EPA 
will require the rest of the industry to use this equipment as well. So, a firm may 
gain a slight advantage in market power or a short term increase in profits 
because they were able to begin implementing this equipment sooner. Notice that 
when the firm adds this technology under regulation the increase in their profits 
are enclosed by the area a, b, and d, but when they add this technology under 
effluent charges they increase their profits by the area enclosed by a, b, and c. 
Under effluent charges a firm is able to implement this technology immediately, 
thereby receiving the benefit for a longer period. So not only do they gain a greater 
increase in profits or market power from this innovation, they are able to gain 
these advantages until another firm  can match their innovation. This additional 
profit would induce firms to take risks in developing new technology and finding 




The third point is the size of the welfare loss created by a mistaken level of 
the policy. Elasticity of the MSB (Marginal Social Benefits) curve and the MCC 
curve affect the size of the welfare loss created by the two policies. Effluent 
charges lim it the maximum marginal cost that will be imposed on a firm for their 
effluents regardless of the level produced. Regulation puts a lim it on the amount 
of effluents that w ill be produced regardless of the cost to firms. This is a good 
starting point for deciding which policy to use. The more critical it is to reduce 
waste, and the less important it is that the pertinent industry is negatively affected, 
the better regulation is. This can be illustrated by manipulating the basic graph 
used earlier. As it becomes more critical to achieve a certain amount of 
abatement the marginal social benefits curve becomes less elastic as illustrated in 
graph 3. This causes larger social welfare losses from an effluent charge policy, 
w  and a smaller one from a regulation policy. In Graph 3 with MSB 1, an elastic
curve, the welfare loss for MCC1 with an effluent charge is b, d, e where with a
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regulation policy it is a, b, c. W ith MSB2, an inelastic curve, the welfare loss for 
an effluent charge is f, g, h, d where with a regulation policy it is a, f, c. You wilt 
see that if you use MCC2 you will find the same results.
Graph 3
SOURCE:
The negative effects to the pertinent industry become more profound, as 
illustrated in Graph 4 by the marginal control cost function becoming less elastic, 
the welfare loss from regulation becomes more severe while the welfare loss from 
effluent charges lessens. In Graph 4 with MCC1, an elastic curve, and MSB 1 
regulation gives us a welfare loss of a, b, c while the effluent charge gives us a 
loss of b, d, e with MCC2, an inelastic curve, and MSB 1 regulation gives us a 
welfare loss of a, f, c while effluent charges give us a loss of d, f, g, h. You w ill see 




Now that we have seen that effluent charges can be in society's best 
interests, we must consider the affected parties. There are three groups of people 
who influence policy choice. The first is the general populace. Since our 
government is elected, the beliefs of the general populace are an important 
influence on public policy. The current feeling of the populace seems to be 
against the effluent charge. Taxes are rarely supported by the general populace. 
Detractors of the policy have also done a good job of convincing people that they 
would pay the tax associated with effluent charges. Additionally detractors say 
that it wouldn't have anything to do with cleaning up the environment, but would 
just increase the income of the government. A specific part of this group is the 
environmental groups. They have a strong lobby in W ashington and most of 
them if not all are against this policy. They feel it is selling our world and that the 
w  people making the decisions won't be motivated to protect the world as the
environmentalists want.
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A second group is the government. This consists of committees making 
recommendations and decisions on environmental issues, the elected officials, 
and government agencies like the EPA. The government is also against effluent 
charges. This seems to be because of the lack of support by the general 
populace and business, as well as the investment of time, money, and training in 
the current system.
Finally, there is business. Business seems to be against effluent charges 
as well. The reason for this is not so obvious as the others. Effluent charges 
would return the decision process to business. They would be able to decide how 
to reduce and how much effluent to reduce. There is evidence to support that this 
would actually lower businesses' costs. If this is true, why is business against this 
policy and why do economist support it? Lets take a closer look at how this policy 
would affect individual businesses.
Regulation on how a firm treats its effluents would be removed. A tax on 
each unit of effluent would be levied. A firm would then treat each unit of pollutant 
that could be treated for a lower cost than the tax. This tax would raise the 
Marginal Cost of Production, because in most cases the level of effluents would 
be directly related to the level of production and therefore the amount of the tax 
would be directly related to the level of production. However, since firms would be 
allowed to install the pollution abatement equipment best suited to them it is 
logical to assume they would be able to find less costly means of reducing their 
effluents. This would lower their fixed costs. Lets create a model so we can take a 
'w  closer look at how this change in MC and FC will effect an individual firm.
7
wW
First we must list our assumptions.
1) All variables other than those representing the change in MC and FC for a 
change in policies are constant. This is so we can isolate the effect the 
change in policies is having on the firm.
2) All firms existing within the industry are homogenous, therefore the 
industries cost and revenue curves are sim ilar to the firms. This is to 
simplify the model into a workable form.
3) The market system is functioning in perfect competition except for the 
affects the abatement policies have on it
4) The only difference between firms existing in the industry and those 
attempting to enter is their fixed cost for pollution reduction. This is to 
isolate the affect the change in policy has on the firm.
5) Both policies are implemented perfectly and the same level of abatement is 
targeted for both policies. This is to simplify the model into a workable 
form.
6) AR(Q)=AR(q)=100-Q. The average revenue of the industry is equal to the 
average revenue of a firm(The units of course are different but the relation 
is the same) This is because of assumption 2 and for the remainder of the 
assumptions i w ill only use Q, but this stands for both Q and q. The 
formula 100-Q is used because there w ill be no shift in the AR curve




8) Cr(Q)=aQ3+bQ2+cQ+d{+e}. This equation is used as the cost function 
under regulation because it creates a curve that closely resembles most
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cost curves in reality. The part in brackets represents the difference 









12) Ce(Q)=aQ3+bQ2+cQ+fQ+d+g{+h}. This equation is used as the cost 
function under effluent charges because it creates a curve that closely 
resembles most cost curves in reality. The part in brackets represents the 









16) a>0, b<0, and c>0 This is because the MC function should be positive 
throughout. It is not reasonable to be able to produce another unit at a 0 or 
negative cost. For this to be true its graph, a parabola, must plot as a U not 
an inverse U. Hence the coefficient of the term (a) must be positive. 
Furthermore the minimum point, where d(MCr(Q))/dQ=6aQ+2b=0, must be
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positive. Therefore MC(Q), where Q=-2b/6a=-b/3a, must be positive. This 
is definitely a minimum because d2(MCr(Q))/dQ2=6a, and since a>0 it is 
always positive. So MCrmjn(Q) = 3a(-b/3a)2+2b(-b/3a)+c = (3ac-b2)/3a 
>0. For this to be true 3ac>b2 , and so c>0, because a>0 so if c is not >0 
3ac w ill be 0 or negative and therefore not less than b2 since squares are 
always positive. W e also know that Q must be positive because you can't 
produce a negative output. So Q=-b/3a must be positive. For this to be 
true b < 0 because a > 0.
17) d>0 d represents the fixed costs to a firm , and logically these must usually 
be positive.
18) e>0 Assumed to be positive because it represents additional fixed costs for 
a new firm versus an existing firm under a regulation policy.
19) f>0 Assumed to be positive because represents new tax.
20) g<0 Assumed to be negative because it represents the reduction in 
necessary fixed costs for pollution reduction due to the removal of 
government requirements.
21) h < e represents additional fixed costs for a new firm versus an existing 
firm under an effluent charge policy. Since we assume a firm can better 
choose technology to reduce their effluents than the government, we 
assume h < e. It is also possible for h to be negative because an entering 
firm w ill not have certain unamoratized capitol expenditures from obsolete 
abatement equipment.





















Now let us consider how the Industry would look under perfect competition 
and monopoly with both these policies. Profit maximization in a competitive 
market occurs where AR=MC. Profit maximization in a monopoly market occurs 





Lets look at this mathematically.








Q*rc is defined where 
100-Q *rc=3aQ*rc2+2bQ*rc+c or 
-Q*rc =3aQ*rc2+2bQ*rc+c-100 or 
W  Q*rc =100-(3aQ*rc2+2bQ*rc+c)
Q*ec is defined where
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w100-Q*ec-3aQ *ec2+2bQ*ec+c+f or 
-Q*ec =3aQ*ec2+2bQ*ec+c+f-100 or 
Q*ec =100-(3aQ*ec2+2bQ*ec+c)-f 
So our Q’ s are
Q 'rm  =(100-(3aQ*rm2+2bQ*rrn+c))/2 
Q*em = 0 00-(3aQ*em2+2bQ*em+c)/2)-(f/2)
Q*rc = 100-(3aQ*rc2+2bQ*rc+c)
Q*ec =100-(3aQ*ec2+2bQ‘ ec+c)-f
Notice that in both perfect competition and perfect monopoly the difference 
in Q* is based solely on f. For perfect monopoly it is -(f/2) when you change to an 
effluent charge and for perfect competition it is -f. Since we have seen that f>0, 
notice that a change to an effluent charge would reduce the quantity produced by 
the industry in both cases, regardless of the savings on fixed costs.
Lets look at how price is affected mathematically. Since P* is equal to 
















Notice that once again in both perfect competition and perfect monopoly 
the difference in P* is based solely on f. For perfect monopoly it is +(f/2) when 
you change to an effluent charge and for perfect competition it is +f. Since we 
have seen that f>0, notice that a change to an effluent charge would increase the 
price of goods within the industry in both cases, regardless of the savings on fixed 
costs.
We know though that there are no known cases of a perfect monopoly or 
perfect competition. W hat these prices and quantities really represent is the 
parameters within which the market w ill fall. Since we know that the AR curve 
represents the price of goods at different quantities and that under our 
assumptions the AR curve is fixed, we know that the market equilibrium will be 
somewhere between the monopoly and competitive equilibrium’s found for each 
policy and along the AR curve. Second we have stated earlier in our assumptions 
that the market is working in perfect competition except for the affect that the 
abatement policy has on it. This isolates the affect the policies have on 
competition.
Now lets look at how the change in costs will affect individual firms in a 
w  profit maximizing industry.
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Graph 6
W e see that existing firms are in equilibrium at the same levels as perfect 
competition. New firms however although they have the same MC have a 
different FC and so different AC. Because it would take a price at the new firms' 
equilibrium to induce entrance into the market and the firms are profit maximizers 
the existing firm s are able to price just below this level.
Firms w ill charge a price slightly below the level that new firms would have 
to charge to enter the market. So lets find the price new firms would need to 
charge. First we need to find at what q* their MC=AC. This w ill be their minimum 
average cost. So the price, if you plug this into the MC or AC curves, w ill be the 
minimum price they would be willing to sell their product for. So we need to find 
q*rn and the q*en and plug them into the ACrn and ACen respectively. W e can 
w  then plug them into MCrn and MCen to check our answer.
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q*rn is where
(aq*m3+bq*m2+cq*rn+cl+e)/q*rn=3aq*rn2+2bq*m+ co r 
(aq*rn2+bq*m+c)+((d+e)/q*rn)=3aq*rn2+2bq*rn+ co r 











Notice that the difference between q*rn and q*en 's related only to the 
difference between d+e and d+g+h. In other words it is the difference in total fixed 
costs for an entering firm that affects the quantity a firm produces.






Since q*rn and q*en are being plugged into the formula we know that the 
total fixed costs w ill affect the difference in price. Once again the total fixed costs 
are involved in this formula specifically. In addition the change in marginal costs 
affect the price.
Given that we know the constants in these formulas we can estimate the 
affect a change in policy would have on price and quantity. W hat is more 
important, however, is how this change affects a firm 's economic profits. We now 
know what quantity a firm w ill produce under both policies. Their economic profits 
will be equal to this value multiplied by the difference between the market price 
minus AC for the firm at that q and under that policy. Mathematically this is. 
(qmK((a((qrn))3+b((qm ))2+c((q m » +d+e)/(qm))-((a(((qrn))3+b((qm ))2+c((clrn))
: , +d)/(qm))) =(qrn)(«/qrn)=e-
The economic profit for a firm under effluent charges is.
(qen)((a((qen))3+b((qen))2+c((qen))+f((qen))+d+g+h)/(qen))-
((a((qen))3+b((qen))2+c((qen))+f((qen))+d+g)/(qen))=(qen)(h/(qen))=h
Notice that neither the change in marginal costs nor the change in an 
existing firm 's fixed costs has any effect on a firm 's profits. Only the change in the 
additional fixed costs an entering firm  has affects the profits. So, if h < e, the 
former assumptions are in place, and firms are profit maximizers, those firms who 
aren't afraid of failing w ill be against effluent charges.
Lets repeat the findings. The parameters of the market are affected by the 
change in marginal cost alone. The change in quantity produced by a firm is 
w  affected by the change in the total fixed costs of a firm  trying to enter the market.
The market price will be affected by both the change in total costs of entering firms
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and the change in marginal costs. Finally, the change in economic profits w ill be 
affected solely by the change in the additional fixed costs an entering firm  would 
face compared to an existing firm.
Creating public policy to protect our environment is a complex process. 
There are several reasons to believe effluent charges could be an effective 
alternative to regulation. First, it is a least cost solution. Second, it creates 
incentive to prevent pollution. Third as the MSB curve becomes more elastic and 
or the MCC curve becomes less elastic the welfare loss from a mistake in 
regulation becomes more profound while the loss from a mistake with an effluent 
charge lessens. These points show how effluent charges can be a better choice 
than regulation.
Still support for effluent charges is not there. The general populace is 
afraid that the policy w ill be implemented in a way that causes more damage than 
good. The government supports the policies it already has a large investment in. 
Business realizes that it w ill often reduce barriers to entry thereby reducing their 
economic profits. The way effluent charges are perceived will have to go through 
a great deal of change before any large scale policy involving them is adopted.
I feel that effluent charges should be added to the EPA’s choice of policy. It 
is an efficient policy in theory, and could be used very effectively on large scale 
problems with low costs of abatement. Effluent charges should compliment rather 
than replace regulation. Between regulation and effluent charges a very complete 
and adaptable policy could be created to deal with the negative externality 
problems of production.
The real problem with effluent charges is their implementation. As with any 
policy offered in this area, the potential to alter it for individual gain is immense. 
Several areas stand out. The first is the problem with measuring effluents. One 
answer is to put that responsibility on the firm. This could be successful, but only 
if there were severe penalties for fraud aimed at the people responsible. A second 
problem is setting the proper tax. There is the potential of the people in charge of 
setting the tax having personal interests involved with the firm s involved or the 
environmental groups, etc. In addition if the people who set the tax are 
responsible or are under the supervision of those responsible for spending the 
revenues you again have the possibility that the tax won't be set to attain the 
proper pollution level.
Effluent charges deserve a more in depth look. They are probably the best 
choice of policy in many cases. They are efficient and transfer the costs to those 
that receive the benefits. When properly implemented they w ill greatly improve 
the government's capability to internalize the negative externality of pollution.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, James E., Public Policymaking (Boston: Houghton Mifflin company, 
1990).
Baumol, W illiam J. and Oates, Wallace E., The Theory of Environmental Policy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1988).
Chiang, Alpha C., Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1984).
Cochran, Clarke E., Mayer, Lawrence C., Carr, T. R., and Cayer, N. Josephe, 
American Public Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
Gordon, John Steele, "The American Environment," American Heritage. Oct. 
1993: 30.
Seneca, Joseph J. and Taussig, Michael K., Environmental Economics 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984).
